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Abstract. We give a lattice reduction algorithm that achieves root
Hermite factor k1/(2k) in time kk/8+o(k) and polynomial memory. This
improves on the previously best known enumeration-based algorithms
which achieve the same quality, but in time kk/(2e)+o(k). A cost of kk/8+o(k)
was previously mentioned as potentially achievable (Hanrot-Stehlé’10)
or as a heuristic lower bound (Nguyen’10) for enumeration algorithms.
We prove the complexity and quality of our algorithm under a heuristic
assumption and provide empirical evidence from simulation and imple-
mentation experiments attesting to its performance for practical and
cryptographic parameter sizes. Our work also suggests potential avenues
for achieving costs below kk/8+o(k) for the same root Hermite factor,
based on the geometry of SDBKZ-reduced bases.
1 Introduction
The cost of (strong) lattice reduction has received renewed attention in recent
years due to its relevance in cryptography. Indeed, lattice-based constructions
are presumed to achieve security against quantum adversaries and enable power-
ful functionalities such as computation on encrypted data. Concrete parameters
for such schemes are derived from the difficulty of finding relatively short non-
zero vectors in a lattice: the parameters are chosen based on extrapolations of
the cost of the BKZ algorithm [SE94] and its variants [CN11,AWHT16,MW16].
These algorithms make repeated calls to an oracle that solves the Shortest Vec-
tor Problem (SVP), i.e. that finds a shortest non-zero vector in any lattice.
Concretely, BKZ with block size k finds relatively short vectors in lattices of
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dimensions n ≥ k using a k-dimensional SVP solver. The cost of this SVP solver
is the dominating component of the cost of BKZ and its variants.
The SVP solver can be instantiated with enumeration-based algorithms,
whose asymptotically most efficient variant is Kannan’s algorithm [Kan83]. It
has a worst-case complexity of kk/(2 e)+o(k), where k is the dimension of the
lattice under consideration [HS07]. This bound is sharp, up to the o(k) term
in the exponent [HS08]. If called on an n-dimensional lattice, then BKZ with
block size k outputs a vector of norm ≈ (k1/(2k))n ·Vol(L)1/n in time ≈ kk/(2 e),
when n is sufficiently large compared to k. The k1/(2k) term is called the root
Hermite factor and quantifies the strength of BKZ. The trade-off between root
Hermite factor and running-time achieved by BKZ has remained the best known
for enumeration-based SVP solvers since the seminal work of Schnorr and Euch-
ner almost 30 years ago. (The analysis of Kannan’s algorithm and hence BKZ
was improved in [HS07], but not the algorithm itself.) Other algorithms, such
as [GN08a,MW16,ALNS19], achieve the same asymptotic trade-off with milder
conditions on n/k.
We note that while lattice reduction libraries, such as FPLLL [dt19a], the
Progressive BKZ Library (PBKZ) [AWHT18] and NTL [Sho18], implement BKZ
with an enumeration-based SVP solver, they do not rely on Kannan’s algorithm:
NTL implements enumeration with LLL preprocessing; FPLLL and PBKZ imple-
ment enumeration with stronger preprocessing (typically BKZ with a smaller
block size) but not with sufficiently strong preprocessing to satisfy the condi-
tions of [Kan83,HS07]. Hence, the running-times of these implementations is not
established by the theorems in these works.
It has been suggested that the running-time achieved by BKZ for the same
output quality might potentially be improved. In [HS10], it was argued that
the same root Hermite factor would be achieved by BKZ in time ≈ kk/8 if
the Gram–Schmidt norms of so-called HKZ-reduced bases were decreasing geo-
metrically. In [Ngu10], the same quantity was suggested as a cost lower bound
for enumeration-based lattice reduction algorithms. On this basis, several works
have speculatively assumed this cost [ANS18,ACD+18]. However, so far, no lat-
tice reduction algorithm achieving root Hermite factor k1/(2k) in time ≈ kk/8
was known.
Contributions. Our main contribution is an enumeration-based lattice re-
duction algorithm that runs in time kk/8 and achieves root Hermite factor
k
1
2k (1+o(1)), where k is a cost parameter akin to the “block size” of the BKZ
algorithm (the notion of “block size” for our algorithm is less straightforward,
see below). It uses polynomial memory and can be quantumly accelerated to
time kk/16 using [ANS18]. Our analysis relies on a strengthened version of the
Gaussian Heuristic.
To estimate the cost of lattice reduction algorithms, the literature typi-
cally relies on concrete experiments and simulations that extrapolate them (see,
e.g. [CN11,Che13,MW16,BSW18]). Indeed, the data given in [Che13] is very
broadly appealed to. However, this data only covers up to block size of 250
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(below cryptographically relevant block sizes) and no source code is available.
As an intermediate contribution, we reproduce and extend the data in [Che13]
using publicly available tools such as [dt19a,dt19b] (see Section 2.5). Using this
extended dataset, we then argue that BKZ as implemented in public lattice
reduction libraries has running-time closely matching kk/(2 e) (Figure 2). Our
cost improvement hence required a different algorithm and not just an improved
analysis of the state-of-the-art.
In Section 4 we propose a variant of our improved lattice reduction algo-
rithm that works well in practice. We run simulations and conduct concrete
experiments to verify its efficiency, while we leave as a future work to formally
analyse it. The simulations suggest that it achieves root Hermite factors ≈ k 12k
in time kk/8, at least up to k ≈ 1, 000 (which covers cryptographic parameters).
Our implementation of this algorithm beats FPLLL’s SVP enumeration from
dimension ≈ 100 onward. We consider the difference between these two variants
as similar to the difference between Kannan’s algorithm and what is routinely
implemented in practice such as in FPLLL and PBKZ. We will refer to the former
as the “asymptotic variant” and the latter as the “practical variant”. Since our
results rely on empirical evidence and simulations, we provide the source code
used to produce our figures and the data being plotted as an attachment to the
electronic version of the full version of this work.
Key idea. Our new algorithms decouple the preprocessing context from the enu-
meration context: they preprocess a projected sublattice of larger dimension than
they aim to enumerate over (as a result, the notion of “block size” is less obvious
than in prior works). More concretely, assume that the basis of the preprocessed
projected sublattice is SDBKZ-reduced. Then, as shown in [MW16] under the
Gaussian Heuristic, the first Gram–Schmidt norms ‖b∗i ‖ satisfy Schnorr’s Geo-
metric Series Assumption (GSA) [Sch03]: ‖b∗i ‖/‖b∗i+1‖ ≈ r for some common r,
for all i’s corresponding to the start of the basis. On that “GSA part” of the
lattice basis, the enumeration runs faster than on a typical preprocessed BKZ
block of the same dimension. To achieve SDBKZ-reducedness at a low cost, our
algorithms call themselves recursively.
As a side contribution, we show in the full version of this work that the
bases output by BKZ do not satisfy the GSA (under the Gaussian Heuristic),
contrarily to a common belief (see e.g. [YD17,ANS18,BSW18]). This is why we
use SDBKZ in the asymptotic algorithm. Nevertheless, for handlable dimensions,
BKZ seems to deviate only slightly from the GSA and as it is a little simpler to
implement than SDBKZ, it seems to remain preferable in practice. This is why
we use BKZ as preprocessing in the practical algorithm.
To illustrate the idea of our new algorithms, we consider a BKZ-reduced
(resp. SDBKZ-reduced) basis with block size k, in a lattice of dimension n =
⌈(1 + c) · k⌋ for various k and c. We choose n ≥ k to demonstrate the impact of
the GSA region on the enumeration cost. We then estimate the enumeration cost
(without pruning) for re-checking that the first basis vector is a shortest non-zero
vector in the very first block of size k. For the implementation of this simulation,
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see simu_c_cost.py, attached to the electronic version of the full version of this
work. We consider c for c = 0 to 1 with a step size of 0.01. For each c, we take k
from k = 100 to 50, 000 with a step size of 10. Then for each fixed c, we fit the
coefficients a0, a1, a2 of a0 k log k + a1 k + a2 over all k on the enumeration cost
of the first block of size k. The result is plotted in Figure 1. The x-axis denotes
the value of c and the y-axis denotes the interpolated constant in front of the
k log k term.
Let us make several remarks about Figure 1. First, we stress that all leading
constants in Figure 1 are hypothetical (they do not correspond to efficient al-
gorithms) as they assume an already (SD)BKZ-reduced basis with block size k,
i.e. this ignores the preprocessing cost. With that in mind, for c = 0, the simula-
tions show the interpolated constant for both BKZ and SDBKZ is close to 1/(2 e),
which corresponds to [HS07]. For c = 1, the interpolated constant is close to 1/8.
This illustrates the impact of enumeration in the GSA region (corresponding to
Theorem 1). As noted above, in the following section we will describe an algo-
rithm that achieve the corresponding cost of kk/8(1+o(1)). It is worth noting that
for certain c around 0.3, the a0 of the re-examination cost can be below 0.125.
We stress that we do not know how to construct an algorithm that achieves a
cost of ka0·k(1+o(1)) with a0 < 0.125. However, our practical variant of the al-
gorithm seems to achieve cost k0.125·k using the region corresponding to those
c ≈ 0.3.
Fig. 1: Interpolated dominating constant a0 on k log k.
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Discussion. At first sight, the endeavour in this work might appear point-
less since lattice sieving algorithms asymptotically outperform lattice enumer-
ation. Indeed, the fastest SVP solver currently known [BDGL16] has a cost of
20.292n+o(n), where n is the lattice dimension.6 Furthermore, a sieving implemen-
tation [ADH+19] now dominates the Darmstadt SVP Challenge’s Hall of Fame,
6 When using this algorithm as the SVP subroutine in BKZ, we thus obtain a running
time of 20.292 k+o(k) for root Hermite factor k1/(2k).
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indicating that the crossover between enumeration and sieving is well below cryp-
tographic parameter sizes. However, the study of enumeration algorithms is still
relevant to cryptography.
Sieving algorithms have a memory cost that grows exponentially with the
lattice dimension n. For dimensions that are currently handlable, the space re-
quirement remains moderate. The impact of this memory cost is unclear for
cryptographically relevant dimensions. For instance, it has yet to be established
how well sieving algorithms parallelise in non-uniform memory access architec-
tures. Especially, the exponential memory requirement might present a serious
obstacle in some scenarios. In contrast, the memory cost of enumeration grows
as a small polynomial in the dimension.
Comparing sieving and enumeration for cryptographically relevant dimen-
sions becomes even more complex in the context of quantum computations.
Quantum computations asymptotically enable a quadratic speed-up for enu-
meration, and much less for sieving [Laa15, Sec. 14.2.10] even assuming free
quantum-accessible RAM, which would a priori favour enumeration. However,
deciding on how to compare parallelisable classical operations with strictly se-
quential Grover iterations is unclear and establishing the significant lower-order
terms in the quantum costs of these algorithms is an ongoing research programme
(see e.g. [AGPS19])
Further, recent advances in sieving algorithms [LM18,Duc18,ADH+19] apply
lessons learned from enumeration algorithms to the sieving context: while sieving
algorithms are fairly oblivious to the Gram–Schmidt norms of the basis at hand,
the cost of enumeration algorithms critically depend on their limited decrease.
Current sieving strategies employ a simple form of enumeration (Babai’s lift-
ing [Bab86]) to exploit the lattice shape by sieving in a projected sublattice and
lifting candidates for short vectors to the full lattice. Here, more sophisticated
hybrid algorithms permitting flexible trade-offs between memory consumption
and running time seem plausible.
Finally, as illustrated in Figure 1, our work suggests potential avenues for
designing faster enumeration algorithms based on further techniques relying on
the graph of Gram–Schmidt norms.
Open problems. It would be interesting to remove the heuristics utilised in
our analysis to produce a fully proved variant, and to extend the technique
to other lattice reduction algorithms such as slide reduction [GN08a]. Further,
establishing lower bounds on the root Hermite factor achievable in time kk/8+o(k)
for a given dimension of the lattice is an interesting open problem suggested by
this work.
2 Preliminaries
Matrices are denoted in bold uppercase and vectors are denoted in bold lowercase.
By B[i:j) we refer to the submatrix spanned by the columns bi, . . . , bj−1 of B.
We let matrix indices start with index 0. We let pii(·) denote the orthogonal
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projection onto the linear subspace (b0, . . . , bi−1)⊥ (this depends on a matrix B
that will always being clear from context). We let vn = pi
n/2
Γ(1+n/2) ≈ 1√npi
(
2pi e
n
)n/2
denote the volume of the n-dimensional unit ball. We let the logarithm to base 2
be denoted by log and the natural logarithm be denoted by ln.
Below, we may refer to the cost or enumeration parameter k of our algorithms
as a “block size”.
2.1 Lattices
Let B ∈ Qm×n be a full column rank matrix. The lattice L generated by B
is L(B) = {B · x | x ∈ Zn} and the matrix B is called a basis of L(B).
As soon as n ≥ 2, any given lattice L admits infinitely many bases, and full
column rank matrices B,B′ ∈ Qm×n span the same lattice if and only if there
exists U ∈ Zn×n such that B′ = B′ ·U and |det(U)| = 1. The Euclidean norm
of a shortest non-zero vector in L is denoted by λ1(L) and called the minimum
of L. The task of finding a shortest non-zero vector of L from an arbitrary basis
of L is called the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP).
We let B∗ = (b∗0, . . . , b∗n−1) denote the Gram–Schmidt orthogonalisation
of B where b∗i = pii(bi). We write ρ[a:b) for the slope of the log ‖b∗i ‖’s with
i = a, . . . , b − 1, under a mean-squared linear interpolation. We let pii(B[i:j))
denote the local block (pii(bi), . . . , pii(bj−1)) and let pii(L[i:j)) denote the lat-
tice generated by pii(B[i:j)). We will also write pi(L) if the index i and L are
clear from the context. The volume of a lattice L with basis B is defined as
Vol(L) =∏i<n ‖b∗i ‖; it does not depend on the choice of basis of L. Minkowski’s
convex body theorem states that λ1(L) ≤ 2·v−1/nn ·Vol(L)1/n. We define the root
Hermite factor of a basis B of a lattice L as rhf(B) = (‖b0‖/Vol(L)1/n)1/(n−1).
The normalization by the (n− 1)-th root is justified by the fact that the lattice
reduction algorithms we consider in this work achieve root Hermite factors that
are bounded independently of the lattice dimension n. Given as input an arbi-
trary basis of L, the task of finding a non-zero vector of L of norm ≤ γ ·Vol(L)1/n
is called Hermite-SVP with parameter γ (γ-HSVP).
Lattice reduction algorithms and their analyses often rely on heuristic as-
sumptions. Let L be an n-dimensional lattice and S a measurable set in the
real span of L. The Gaussian Heuristic states that the number of lattice points
in S is |L ∩ S| ≈ Vol(S)/Vol(L). If S is an n-ball of radius r, then the latter
is ≈ vn · rn/Vol(L). By setting vn · rn ≈ Vol(L), we see that λ1(L) is close
to GH(L) := v−1/nn · Vol(L)1/n. Asymptotically, we have GH(L) ≈
√
n
2pi e ·
Vol(L)1/n.
2.2 Enumeration and Kannan’s algorithm
The Enum algorithm [Kan83,FP83] is an SVP solver. It takes as input a basis ma-
trix B of a lattice L and consists in enumerating all (xi, . . . , xn−1) ∈ Zn−i such
that ‖pii(
∑
j≥i xj ·bj)‖ ≤ A for every i < n, where A is an a priori upper bound on
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or estimate of λ1(L) (such as ‖b1‖ and GH(L), respectively). It may be viewed as
a depth-first search of an optimal leaf in a tree indexed by tuples (xi, . . . , xn−1),
where the singletons xn−1 lie at the top and the full tuples (x0, . . . , xn−1) are
the leaves. The running-time of Enum is essentially the number of tree nodes
(up to a small polynomial factor), and its space cost is polynomial. As argued
in [HS07], the tree size can be estimated as maxi<n(vi · Ai/
∏
j≥n−i ‖b∗j‖), un-
der the Gaussian Heuristic. In [ANS18], it was showed that a quadratic speedup
can be obtained quantumly using Montanaro’s quantum backtracking algorithm
(and the space cost remains polynomial). We will rely on the following (classical)
cost bound, derived from [HS07, Subsection 4.1]. It is obtained by optimising the
tree size maxi<n(vi ·Ai/
∏
j≥n−i ‖b∗j‖). We can replace A by twice the Gaussian
Heuristic GH(L) = v−1/nn ·Vol(L)1/n, where Vol(L) =∏j<n ‖b∗j‖. By using the
bounds ‖b∗i ‖ ∈ c · δ−i · [1/2, 2], this optimisation problem boils down to maximis-
ing δni/2−i2/2 for i < n. The maximum is δn2/8 (for i = n/2). The other terms
are absorbed in the 2O(n) factor.
Theorem 1. Let B be a basis matrix of an n-dimensional rational lattice L.
Assume that there exist c > 0 and δ > 1 such that ‖b∗i ‖ ∈ c · δ−i · [1/2, 2], for
all i < n. Then, given B as input (with A = 2 · v−1/nn · Vol(L)1/n), the Enum
algorithm returns a shortest non-zero vector of L within δ n28 ·2O(n) ·poly(size(B))
bit operations. Its space cost is poly(size(B)).
Kannan’s algorithm [Kan83] relies on recursive calls to Enum to improve the
quality of the Gram–Schmidt orthogonalisation of B, so that calling Enum on
the preprocessed B is less expensive. Its cost bound was lowered in [HS07] and
that cost upper bound was later showed to be sharp in the worst case, up to
lower-order terms [HS08].
Theorem 2. Let B be a basis matrix of an n-dimensional rational lattice L.
Given B as input, Kannan’s algorithm returns a shortest non-zero vector of L
within n n2e (1+o(1)) · poly(size(B)) bit operations. Its space cost is poly(size(B)).
In practice, enumeration is accelerated using two main techniques. The first
one, inspired from Kannan’s algorithm, consists in preprocessing the basis with
a strong lattice reduction algorithm, such as BKZ (see next subsection). Note
that BKZ uses an SVP solver in a lower dimension, so these algorithms can
be viewed as calling themselves recursively, in an intertwined manner. The sec-
ond one is tree pruning [SE94,GNR10]. The justifying observation is that some
tree nodes are much more unlikely than others to have leaves in their subtrees,
and are hence discarded. More concretely, one considers the strengthened condi-
tioned ‖pii(
∑
j≥i xj · bj)‖ ≤ ti ·A, for some pruning coefficients ti ∈ (0, 1). These
coefficients can be used to extract a refined estimated enumeration cost as well
as an estimated success probability (see, e.g. [Che13, Sec. 3.3]). By making the
probability extremely small, the cost-over-probability ratio can be lowered and
the probability can be boosted by re-randomising the basis and repeating the
pruned enumeration. This strategy is called extreme pruning [GNR10].
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2.3 Lattice reduction
Given a basis matrix B ∈ Qm×n of a lattice L, the LLL algorithm [LLJL82]
outputs in polynomial time a basis C of L whose Gram–Schmidt norms cannot
decrease too fast: ‖c∗i ‖ ≥ ‖c∗i−1‖/2 for every i < n. In particular, we have
rhf(C) ≤ 2. A lattice basis B is size-reduced if it satisfies |µi,j | ≤ 1/2 for
j < i < n where µi,j = 〈bi, b∗j 〉/〈b∗j , b∗j 〉. A lattice basis B is HKZ-reduced if
it is size-reduced and satisfies ‖b∗i ‖ = λ1(pii(L[i:n))), for all i < n. A basis B
is BKZ-k reduced for block size k ≥ 2 if it is size-reduced and further satisfies
‖b∗i ‖ = λ1(pii(L[i:min(i+k,n)))), for all i < n.
The Schnorr-Euchner BKZ algorithm [SE94] is the lattice reduction algo-
rithm that is commonly used in practice, to obtain bases of better quality than
those output by LLL (there exist algorithms that admit better analyses, such
as [GN08a,MW16,ALNS19], but BKZ remains the best in terms of practical per-
formance reported in the current literature). BKZ inputs a block size k and a
basis matrixB of a lattice L, and outputs a basis which is “close” to being BKZ-k
reduced, up to algorithm parameters. The BKZ algorithm calls an SVP solver in
dimensions ≤ k on projected sublattices of the working basis of an n-dimensional
input lattice. A BKZ sweep consists in SVP solver calls for pii(L[i:min(i+k,n))) for
i from 0 to n − 2. BKZ proceeds by repeating such sweeps, and typically a
small number of sweeps suffices. At each execution of the SVP solver, if we
have λ1(pii(L[i:min(i+k,n)))) < δ · ‖b∗i ‖ where δ < 1 is a relaxing parameter that
is close to 1, then BKZ updates the block pii(B[i:min(i+k,n))) by inserting the
vector found by the SVP solver at index i. It then removes the created linear de-
pendency, e.g. using a gcd computation (see, e.g. [GN08a]). Whether there was
an insertion or not, BKZ finally calls LLL on the local block pii
(
B[i:min(i+k,n))
)
.
The procedure terminates when no change occurs at all during a sweep or af-
ter certain termination condition is fulfilled. The higher k, the better the BKZ
output quality, but the higher the cost: for large n, BKZ achieves root Hermite
factor essentially k1/(2k) (see [HPS11]) using an SVP-solver in dimensions ≤ k a
polynomially bounded number of times.
Schnorr [Sch03] introduced a heuristic on the shape of the Gram–Schmidt
norms of BKZ-reduced bases, called the Geometric Series Assumption (GSA).
The GSA asserts that the Gram–Schmidt norms {‖b∗i ‖}i<n of a BKZ-reduced ba-
sis behave as a geometric series, i.e., there exists r > 1 such that ‖b∗i ‖/‖b∗i+1‖ ≈ r
for all i < n−1. In this situation, the root Hermite factor is√r. It was experimen-
tally observed [CN11] that the GSA is a good first approximation to the shape of
the Gram–Schmidt norms of BKZ. However, as observed in [CN11] and studied
in [YD17], the GSA does not provide an exact fit to the experiments of BKZ
for the last k indices; similarly, as observed in [YD17] and studied in [BSW18],
the GSA also does not fit for the very few first indices (the latter phenomenon
seems to vanish for large k, as opposed to the former).
We will use the self-dual BKZ algorithm (SDBKZ) from [MW16]. SDBKZ
proceeds similarly to BKZ, except that it intertwines forward and backward
sweeps (for choosing the inputs to the SVP solver), whereas BKZ uses only
forward sweeps. Further, it only invokes the SVP solver in dimension exactly k, so
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that a forward sweep consists in considering pii(L[i:i+k)) for i from 0 to n−k and a
backward sweep consists in considering (the duals of) pii(L[i:i+k)) for i from n−k
down to 0. We assume that the final sweep is a forward sweep. We use SDBKZ in
the theoretical analysis rather than BKZ because, under the Gaussian Heuristic
and after polynomially many sweeps, the first n − k Gram–Schmidt norms of
the basis (almost) decrease geometrically, i.e. satisfy the GSA. This may not be
necessary for our result to hold, but this simplifies the computations significantly.
We adapt [MW16] by allowing SDBKZ to rely on a γ-HSVP solver O rather
than on an exact SVP solver (which in particular is a
√
k-HSVP solver). We let
SDBKZO denote the modified algorithm. The analysis of [MW16] can be readily
adapted. We will rely on the following heuristic assumption, which extends the
Gaussian Heuristic.
Heuristic 1 Let O be a γ-HSVP solver in dimension k. During the SDBKZO
execution, each call to O for a projected k-dimensional sublattice pi(L) of the
input lattice L returns a vector of norm ≈ γ · (Vol(pi(L))) 1k .
The SDBKZO algorithm makes the Gram–Schmidt norms converge to a fix-
point, very fast in terms of the number of HSVP calls [MW16, Subsection 4.2].
That fix-point is described in [MW16, Corollary 2]. Adapting these results leads
to the following.
Theorem 3 (Under Heuristic 1). Let O be a γ-HSVP solver in dimension k.
Given as input a basis of an n-dimensional rational lattice L, SDBKZO outputs
a basis B of L such that, for all i < n− k, we have
‖b∗i ‖ ≈ γ
n−1−2i
k−1 · (VolL) 1n .
The number of calls to O is ≤ poly(n) and the bit-size of the output basis is
≤ poly(size(B)).
2.4 Simulating lattice reduction
To understand the behaviour of lattice reduction algorithms in practice, a useful
approach is to conduct simulations. The underlying idea is to model the practical
behaviour of the evolution of the Gram–Schmidt norms during the algorithm
execution, without running a costly lattice reduction. Note that this requires
only the Gram–Schmidt norms and not the full basis. Chen and Nguyen first
provided a BKZ simulator [CN11] based on the Gaussian Heuristic and with an
experiment-driven modification for the blocks at the end of the basis. It relies
on the assumption that each SVP solver call in the projected blocks (except
the ones at the end of the basis) finds a vector whose norm corresponds to the
Gaussian Heuristic applied to that local block. The remaining Gram–Schmidt
norms of the block are updated to keep the determinant of the block constant.
(Note that in the original [CN11] simulator, these Gram–Schmidt norms are not
updated to keep the determinant of the block constant, but are adjusted at the
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end of the sweep to keep the global determinant constant; our variant helps for
taking enumeration costs into account.)
We extend this simulator in two ways: first, we adapt it to estimate the cost
and not only the evolution of the Gram–Schmidt norms; second, we adapt it to
other reduction algorithms, such as SDBKZ. To estimate the cost, we use the
estimates of the full enumeration cost, or the estimated cost of an enumeration
with (extreme) pruning. The full enumeration cost estimate is used in Section 3 to
model our first algorithm for which we can heuristically analyse the quality/cost
trade-off. The pruned enumeration cost estimate is used in Section 4, which aims
to provide a more precise study for practical and cryptographic dimensions. To
find the enumeration cost with pruning, we make use of FPyLLL’s pruningmodule
which numerically optimises pruning parameters for a time/success probability
trade-off using a gradient descent.
In small block sizes, the enumeration cost is dominated by calls to LLL. In
our code, we simply assume that one LLL call in dimension k costs the equivalent
of visiting k3 nodes. This is an oversimplification but avoids completely ignoring
this polynomial factor. We will compare our concrete estimates with empirical
evidence from timing experiments with the implementation in FPLLL, to measure
the effect of this imprecision. This assumption enables us to bootstrap our cost
estimates. BKZ in block size up to, say, 40 only requires LLL preprocessing,
allowing us to estimate the cost of preprocessing with block size up to 40, which
in turn enables us to estimate the cost (including preprocessing) for larger block
sizes etc. To extend the simulation to SDBKZ, we simply run the simulation on
the Gram–Schmidt norms of the dual basis 1/‖b∗n‖, . . . , 1/‖b∗1‖. Our simulation
source code is available as simu.py, as an attachment to the electronic version
of the full version of this work.
We give pseudocode for our costed simulation in Algorithm 1. For BKZ sim-
ulation, we call Algorithm 1 with d = k, c = 0 and with tail(x, y, z) simply
outputting x. For our simulations we prepared Gram–Schmidt shapes for LLL-
reduced lattices in increasing dimensions d on which we then estimate the cost of
running the algorithm in question for increasingly heavy preprocessing parame-
ters k′, selecting the least expensive one. In our search, we initialise c2 = 23 and
then iteratively compute cj+1 given c2, . . . , cj . When we instantiate Algorithm 1
we either manually pick some small t (Section 4) or pick t = ∞ (Section 3.3)
which means to run the algorithm until no more changes are made to the basis.
2.5 State-of-the-art enumeration-based SVP solving in practice
To the best of our knowledge, there is no extrapolated running-time for state-
of-the-art lattice reduction implementations. Furthermore, the simulation data
in [CN11,Che13] is only available up to a block size of 250. The purpose of this
section is to fill this gap by providing extended simulations (and the source code
used to produce them) and by reporting running times using the state-of-the-art
FPyLLL [dt19b] and FPLLL [dt19a] libraries.
First, in Figure 2 we reproduce the data from [Che13, Table 5.2] for the
estimated cost of solving SVP up to dimension 250, using enumeration.
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Algorithm 1: Costed simulation algorithm
Data: Gram–Schmidt profile ℓi = log ‖b∗i ‖ for i = 0, . . . , d− 1.
Data: Block size k ≥ 2.
Data: Preprocessing block size k′ ≥ 2.
Data: Preprocessing sweep count t.
Data: Overshooting parameter c ≥ 0.
Data: Configuration flags.
Data: Cost estimates cj for solving (approx-)SVP in dimensions j = 2, . . . , k′,
including preprocessing cost estimates.
Result: Cost estimate for (approx-)SVP in dimension k.
1 if SDBKZ flag is set in flags then
2 (ℓi)i ← output of [CN11] style simulator for SDBKZ on (ℓi)i for block
size k′ and ≤ t sweeps;
3 else
4 (ℓi)i ← output of [CN11] style simulator for BKZ on (ℓi)i for block size k′
and ≤ t sweeps;
5 end
// account for early termination
6 t← number of preprocessing sweeps actually performed;
7 Cp ← d3; // (estimated) cost of LLL
8 for 0 ≤ i < d− 1 do
9 k∗ ← tail(min(k′, d− i), c, d− i);
10 Cp ← Cp + t · ck∗ ;
11 end
12 if full enumeration cost flag is set in flags then
13 Ce ← full enumeration cost for ℓ0, . . . , ℓk−1;
14 pe ← 1;
15 else
16 (ti)i<k ← optimised pruning coefficients for (ℓi)i<k and preprocessing
cost Cp;
17 Ce, pe ← pruned enumeration cost and success probability, given (ti)i<k;
18 end
19 C ← 1/pe · (Cp + Ce);
20 return C;
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We then also computed the expected cost (expressed as the number of vis-
ited enumeration nodes) up to dimension 500 for Figure 2, see cost.py, at-
tached to the electronic copy of the full version of this work, and Algorithm 1.
We note that the preprocessing strategy adopted in our code is to always run
two sweeps of preprocessing but that preprocessing proceeds recursively, e.g. pre-
processing block size 80 with block size 60 may trigger a preprocessing with block
size 40, if previously we found that preprocessing to be most efficient for solving
SVP-60, as outlined above. This approach matches that of the FPLLL/FPyLLL
strategizer [dt17] which selects the default preprocessing and pruning strate-
gies used in FPLLL/FPyLLL. Thus, the simulation approach resembles that of the
actual implementation.
In Figure 2, we also fitted the coefficients a1, a2 of 1/(2 e)n logn+ a1 ·n+ a2
to dimensions n from 150 to 249.7
Furthermore, we plot the chosen preprocessing block sizes and success prob-
ability of a single enumeration (FPLLL uses extreme pruning) in Figure 3. This
highlights that, even in dimension 500, preprocessing is still well below the
n− o(n) required for Kannan’s algorithm [Kan83,MW15].
Fig. 2: Expected number of nodes visited during enumeration in dimension n.
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our simulation
Figure 4 plots the running-times of FPLLL in terms of enumeration nodes,
timed using call.py, available as an attachment to the electronic version of the
full version of this work. Concretely, running-time in seconds is first converted to
CPU cycles by multiplying with the clock speed 2.6 GHz8 and we then convert
7 Throughout this work, we fit curves to simulation data. For this, we use SciPy’s
scipy.optimize.curve_fit function [VGO+20] which implements a non-linear least-
square fit. To prevent overfitting, we err on the side of fewer parameters and fit on a
subset of the available data, using the remaining data to check the accuracy of the
fit.
8 CPU: Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2690 v4 @ 2.60GHz, machine: “atomkohle”.
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from cycles to nodes by assuming visiting a node takes about 64 clock cycles.9
Figure 4 illustrates that our simulation is reasonably accurate. We note that for
running the timing experiments with FPLLL we relied on FPLLL’s own (recursive
call and pruning) strategies, not those produced by our simulator.
Fig. 3: Reduction strategies used for Figure 2.
(a) Preprocessing block sizes used in our simulations.
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
0
200
400
n
0.87n− 20.32
simulation
(b) Success probability of a single enumeration (in log scale).
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The largest computational results known for finding short vectors in unstruc-
tured lattices is the Darmstadt SVP Challenge [SG10]. This challenge asks con-
testants to find a vector at most 1.05 times larger than the Gaussian Heuris-
tic. Thus, the challenge does not require to solve SVP exactly but the easier
(0.254
√
n)-HSVP problem. The strategy we used for SVP can be adapted to
this problem as well, see chal.py, attached to the electronic version of the full
version of document. To validate our simulation methodology against this data,
we compare our estimates with various entries from the Hall of Fame for [SG10]
and the literature in Figure 5.
We conclude this section by interpreting our simulation results in the context
of BKZ. The quality output by BKZ in practice has been studied in the litera-
9 We note that [CN11] mentions 200 cycles per node, whereas [dt17]’s set_mdc.py
reports 64 cycles per node on our test machine in dimension 55.
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Fig. 4: Number of nodes visited during enumeration in dimension n.
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FP(y)LLL: running-time
FP(y)LLL: visited nodes
In our simulations, the estimate for the number of visited nodes includes the cost of
LLL (expressed as a number of nodes), whereas actually “visited nodes” does not. The
“running-time” (converted from seconds to a number of nodes), on the other hand,
contains all operations as it literally is the cputime.
Fig. 5: Darmstadt SVP Challenge.
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FPLLL: time
“HoF” stands for Hall of Fame [SG10]. Core hours are translated to #nodes by
multiplying by 3600 · 2 · 107, which assumes each core has a 2Ghz CPU and that one
enumeration node costs 64 clock cycles to process. Except for G6K [ADH+19] which
is a sieving implementation, all entries are for variants of lattice-point enumeration.
We translate G6K timings to #nodes in the same way as for other timings, ignoring
that it is not an enumeration implementation. In other words, #nodes is merely a
unit of time here.
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ture [GN08b,Che13,AGVW17,YD17,BSW18]. Thus, our simulations imply that
the running time of BKZ as implemented in [dt19a] achieves root Hermite factor
k1/(2k) is bounded by kk/(2 e)+o(k). Indeed, this bound is tight, i.e. BKZ does not
achieve a lower running time. To see this, consider the sandpile model of BKZ’s
behaviour [HPS11]. It implies that even if we start with a GSA line, this line
from index i onward deteriorates as we perform updates on indices < i. Further-
more, extreme pruning, which involves rerandomising local blocks, destroys the
GSA shape. Thus, we can conclude that in practice BKZ
– achieves root Hermite factor ≈ ( k2pi e · (pi k)
1
k )
1
2(k−1) [Che13]
– in time poly(d) · 21/(2 e) k log k−0.995 k+16.25 ≈ poly(d) · 21/(2 e) k log k−k+16
where the unit of time is the number of nodes visited during enumeration. We
note that a similar conclusion was already drawn in [APS15] and discussed
in [ABD+16]. However, that conclusion was drawn for the unpublished imple-
mentation and limited data in [Che13].
3 Reaching root Hermite factor k 12k (1+o(1)) in time k k8
This section contains our main contribution: a lattice reduction algorithm that
achieves root Hermite factor k 12k (1+o(1)) in time k k8 . We start by a quality
running-time trade-off boosting theorem, based on SDBKZ. We then give and
analyze the main algorithm, FastEnum, and finally propose a simulator for that
algorithm.
3.1 A boosting theorem
We first show that SDBKZ allows to obtain a reduction from a γ′-HSVP solver in
dimension n′ to a γ-HSVP solver in dimension n achieving a larger root Hermite
factor. This reduction is not polynomial-time, but we will later aim at making
it no more costly than the cost of our γ-HSVP solver.
Theorem 4 (Under Heuristic 1). Let O be a γ-HSVP solver in dimension n.
Assume we are given as input a basis B of an n′-dimensional lattice L, with n′ >
n. We first call SDBKZO on B: let C denote the output basis. Then we call the
Enum algorithm on the sublattice basis made of the first n′ − n vectors of C.
This provides a γ′-HSVP solver in dimension n′, with
γ′ ≤ √n′ − n γ nn−1 .
The total cost is bounded by poly(n′) calls to O and γ (n
′−n)2
4(n−1) ·2O(n′−n)·poly(size(B))
bit operations.
Proof. By Theorem 3, we have ‖c∗i ‖ ∈ γ
n′−1−2i
n−1 · (Vol(L)) 1n′ · [1/2, 2], for all i <
n′ − n. Also, the number of calls to O is ≤ poly(n′) and the bit-size of C
is ≤ poly(size(B)).
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By Theorem 1 (with “δ = γ 2n−1 ”), the cost of the call to Enum is bounded as
γ
(n′−n)2
4(n−1) · 2O(n′−n) · poly(size(C)), which, by the above is ≤ γ (n
′−n)2
4(n−1) · 2O(n′−n) ·
poly(size(B)). Further, by Minkowski’s theorem, the vector output by Enum has
norm bounded from above by:
√
n′ − n ·
n′−n−1∏
i=0
(
γ
n′−1−2i
n−1 (Vol(L)) 1n′
) 1
n′−n
=
√
n′ − n · γ nn−1 · (Vol(L)) 1n′ .
This completes the proof of the theorem. ⊓⊔
Note that the result is not interesting if n′ − n is chosen too small, as such
a choice results in an increased root Hermite factor. Also, if n′ − n is chosen
too large, then the cost grows very fast. We consider the following instructive
application of Theorem 4. By Theorem 2, Kannan’s algorithm finds a shortest
non-zero of L in time n n2 e (1+o(1)) · poly(size(B)), when given as input a basis
B of an n-dimensional lattice L. In particular, it solves γ-HSVP with γ = √n
and provides a root Hermite factor ≤ n 12n . We want to achieve a similar root
Hermite factor, but for a lower cost. Now, for a cost parameter k, we would
like to restrict the cost to k k8 · poly(size(B)) (ideally, while still achieving root
Hermite factor k 12k ). We hence choose an integer k0 := e4 (1+o(1))k. This indeed
provides a cost bounded as k k8 · poly(size(B)), but this only solves γ0-HSVP
with γ0 = Θ(
√
k0) in dimension k0, i.e. only provides a root Hermite factor
≈ √k0
1
k0 = k
2
k e (1+o(1)) ≈ k 0.74k , which is much more than k 12k . So far, we have
not done anything but a change of variable. Now, let us see how Theorem 4 can
help. We use it with O being Kannan’s algorithm in dimension “n = k0”. We
set “n′ = k1” with k1 = k0 + ⌈
√
k0k⌉. This value is chosen so that the total
cost bound of Theorem 4 remains k k8 ·poly(size(B)). The achieved root Hermite
factor is ≤ k
1
k(e /4+
√
e /4)
(1+o(1)) ≈ k 0.66k . Overall, for a similar cost bound, we
have decreased the achieved root Hermite factor.
3.2 The FastEnum Algorithm
We iterate the process above to obtain the FastEnum algorithm, described in
Algorithm 2. For this reason, we define k0 = x0 · k with x0 = e4 (1 + o(1)) and,
for all i ≥ 1:
ki = ⌈xi · k⌉ with xi = xi−1 +
√
xi−1
i
. (1)
We first study the sequence of xi’s.
Lemma 1. We have i+ 1−√i < xi < i+ 1 for all i ≥ 1.
Proof. The upper bound can be readily proved using an induction based on (1).
It may be numerically checked that the lower bound holds for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. We
show by induction to prove that 1− xii < 1√i − 2i for i ≥ 4, which is a stronger
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statement. It may be numerically checked that the latter holds for i = 4. Now,
assume it holds for some i− 1 ≥ 4 and that we aim at proving it for i. We have
1− xi
i
=
1
i
(
(i− 1)
(
1− xi−1
i− 1
)
+
(
1−
√
xi−1
i
))
=
1
i
(
(i− 1)
(
1− xi−1
i− 1
)
+
√
i− 1
i
(
1−
√
xi−1
i− 1
)
+ 1−
√
i− 1
i
)
.
Now, note that
√
xi−1
i−1 > 0.2 (using our induction hypothesis). Using the bound
1 −√t < 12 (1 − t) + 14 (1 − t)2 which holds for all t > 0.2, we can bound 1 − xii
from above by:
1
i
(
(i− 1)
(
1− xi−1
i− 1
)
+ 1 +
√
i− 1
i
(
− 1 + 1
2
(
1− xi−1
i− 1
)
+
1
4
(
1− xi−1
i− 1
)2))
.
It now suffices to observe that the right hand side is smaller than 1√
i
− 2i , when
1− xi−1i−1 is replaced by 1√i−1− 2i−1 . This may be checked with a computer algebra
software. ⊓⊔
The FastEnum algorithm (Algorithm 2) consists in calling the process de-
scribed in Theorem 4 several times, to improve the root Hermite factor while
staying within a k k8 cost bound.
Algorithm 2: The FastEnum algorithm.
Data: A cost parameter k and a level i ≥ 0.
Data: A basis matrix B ∈ Qki×ki , with ki defined as in (1).
Result: A short non-zero vector of L(B).
1 if i = 0 then
2 b← output of Kannan’s enumeration algorithm on B;
3 else
4 C ← output of SDBKZO on B with O being FastEnum for i− 1;
5 b← Enum
(
C[0:ki−ki−1)
)
with ki−1 defined as in (1);
6 end
7 return b;
Theorem 5 (Under Heuristic 1). Let k ≥ 4 tending to infinity, and i ≤
2o(k).10 The FastEnum algorithm with parameters k and i solves γi-HSVP
in dimension ki, with γi ≤ k i+12 (1+o(1)). For i ≥ 1, the corresponding root
Hermite factor is below k
i+1
2(i+1−√i)k (1+o(1)). Further, FastEnum runs in time
k
k
8 (1+o(1))+i·O(1) · poly(size(B)).
10 We stress that in this theorem, all asymptotic notations are with respect to k only.
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For constant values of i (as a function of k), the root Hermite factor is
not quite k 12k (1+o(1)), but it is so for any choice of i = ω(1). For i satisfying
both i = ω(1) and i = o(k), FastEnum reaches a root Hermite factor k 12k (1+o(1))
in time k k8 (1+o(1)) · poly(size(B)).
Proof. For γ0 = Θ(
√
k) and, by Theorem 4, we have γi ≤
√
ki − ki−1 · γ
ki−1
ki−1−1
i−1
for all i ≥ 1. Using the definition of the ki’s and the bounds of Lemma 1, we
obtain, for i ≥ 1:
γi ≤
(
1 +
xi−1
i
k2
)1/4
· γ
k(i−√i−1)+1
k(i−√i−1)−1
i−1 ≤
√
2k · γ1+
2
ki/2−1
i−1 .
Using k ≥ 4, we see that the latter is ≤ √2kγ1+ 8kii−1 . By unfolding the recursion,
we get, for i ≥ 1:
γi ≤
√
2k
1+
∑i−1
j=0
∏i−1
ℓ=j(1+
8
k(ℓ+1)
) · γ
∏i−1
ℓ=0(1+
8
k(ℓ+1)
)
0 .
Now, note that we have (using the bound∑i−1ℓ=0 1ℓ+1 ≤ ln(i)+1, and the inequal-
ities 1 + x ≤ exp(x) ≤ 1 + 2x for x ∈ [0, 1])
i−1∏
ℓ=j
(1+
8
k(ℓ+ 1)
) ≤ exp
i−1∑
ℓ=j
8
k(ℓ+ 1)
 ≤ exp(8
k
(ln(i) + 1)
)
≤ 1+16
k
(ln(i)+1).
As i ≤ 2o(k), the latter is ≤ 1 + o(1). Overall, this gives γi ≤ k i+12 (1+o(1)). The
claim on the root Hermite factor follows from the lower bound of Lemma 1.
We now consider the run-time of the algorithm, and in particular the term
γ
(ki−ki−1)2
4(ki−1−1)
i−1 ·2O(ki−ki−1) from Theorem 4. Recall that by definition of the ki’s, we
have ki − ki−1 ≤ 1 +
√
ki−1k
i . Using the upper bound of Lemma 1, we obtain
that ki − ki−1 ≤ O(k), and hence that 2O(ki−ki−1) ≤ 2O(k). We also have
γ
(ki−ki−1)2
4(ki−1−1)
i−1 ≤ k
i
2 (1+o(1))
ki−1k
4i(ki−1−1) ≤ k k8 (1+o(1)).
Further, the number of recursive calls is bounded as poly(∏j≤i kj). By Lemma 1,
this is ≤ ki·O(1). To complete the proof, it may be shown using standard tech-
niques that all bases occurring during the algorithm have bit-sizes bounded as
poly(size(B)) (where the bound is independent from i). ⊓⊔
3.3 Simulation of asymptotic behaviour
In this subsection, we instantiate the FastEnum algorithm as described in Al-
gorithm 2 and confirm its asymptotic behaviour via simulations. Note that the
FastEnum algorithm requires SDBKZ subroutines. To simulate this subroutine,
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we use the costed simulation of Algorithm 1 with flags: SDBKZ and full enumer-
ation cost. We also omit the cost of LLL in the simulation as the enumeration
cost dominates in the parameter range considered in this subsection.
To compare the simulation with the theorems, we consider two scenarios.
In the first one, called “Theoretical” we numerically compute the ki’s, γi’s and
the slope of the Gram–Schmidt log-norms of the enumeration block (i.e. the first
ki−ki−1 vectors) according to Theorem 5. Here the index i denotes the recursion
level. Similarly, ki and γi are defined in the same way as in (1) and Theorem 5,
respectively. In the second one, called “Simulated” we still set the ki’s according
to (1). However, at the i-th level, we first run an SDBKZ simulation on a lattice
of dimension ki, using the γi−1-HSVP (simulated) oracle from the previous level.
Here, the Hermite factor γi−1 is computed from the simulated basis at the (i−1)-
th level. The initial γ0 is computed from a simulated HKZ-reduced basis of
dimension k0. During the SDBKZ simulation, for each HSVP call, we assume
that the same Hermite factor γi−1 is achieved. We let the simulated SDBKZ run
until no change occurs to the basis or if it has already achieved the theoretical
root Hermite factor at the same level, as guided by the proof of Theorem 5.
After the simulated SDBKZ preprocessing, we simulate an enumeration in the
first block of dimension ki − ki−1. The enumeration cost is estimated using the
full enumeration cost model (see Section 2.4), since here we are only interested in
the asymptotic behaviour (we defer to Section 4 for the concrete behaviour). For
a fixed cost parameter k, we consider ⌈ln k⌋ recursion levels i = 0, . . . , (⌈ln k⌋−1).
For the implementation used for these experiments, we refer to simu_asym.py
attached to the electronic version of the full version of this work. This simulation
algorithm is an instantiation of Algorithm 1.
Using the simulator described above, we computed the achieved simulated
root Hermite factors for various cost parameters k from 100 to 2, 999. The results
are plotted in Figure 6. We also computed the theoretical root Hermite factors
as established by Theorem 5. More precisely, we used the proof of Theorem 5
to update the root Hermite factors recursively, replacing the term √n′ − n of
Theorem 4 by v−1/(n
′−n)
n′−n (which corresponds to using the Gaussian Heuristic).
It can be observed that the theoretical and simulated root Hermite factors agree
closely.
Figure 7 shows the number of nodes visited during the simulation from k =
100 to 2, 999, as well as a curve fit. As an example of the output, Figure 8 plots the
Gram–Schmidt log-norms of the (simulated) reduced basis for k = 1, 000 right
after 7 levels of recursion. Note that last Gram–Schmidt norms of the basis have
the shape of those of an HKZ-reduced basis, since we use Kannan’s algorithm
at level 0. Also, the successive segments correspond to levels of recursion, their
lengths decrease and their respective (negative) slopes decrease with the indices
of the Gram–Schmidt norms.
Finally, we plot the Gram–Schmidt log-norms slope for k = 1, 000 during the
first 20 recursion levels. At level i, we compute the slope for the enumeration
region (i.e. the first block of size ki−ki−1). It can be observed that the simulated
slope is indeed increasing.
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Fig. 6: Simulated and theoretical root Hermite factors for k = 100 to 2, 999 after
ln k levels of recursion.
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Fig. 7: Number of nodes in full enumeration visited during simulation, and a fit.
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Fig. 8: Gram–Schmidt log-norms of simulated experiments with k = 1, 000 after
7 ≈ ln k recursion levels.
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Fig. 9: Simulated and theoretical Gram–Schmidt log-norms slope of enumeration
region, for k = 1, 000 and during the first 20 iterations.
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4 A practical variant
It can be observed that, in our analysis of Algorithm 2, the dimension of the
lattice is relatively large. It is thus interesting to investigate algorithms that
require smaller dimensions. In this subsection, we describe a practical strategy
that works with dimensions d = O(k) where the hidden constants are small. As
mentioned in the introduction, practical implementations of lattice reduction
algorithms often deviate from the asymptotically efficient variants, e.g. by ap-
plying much weaker preprocessing than required asymptotically. In this section,
we use numerically optimised preprocessing and enumeration strategies to pa-
rameterise Algorithm 3, which we view as a practical variant of Algorithm 2,
working with dimensions d = ⌈(1 + c) · k⌉ for some small constant c ≥ 0. It
differs from Algorithm 2 in two respects. First, it applies BKZ preprocessing in-
stead of SDBKZ preprocessing. This is merely an artefact of the latter seemingly
not providing an advantage in the parameter ranges we considered. Second, the
algorithm adapts the enumeration dimension based on the “space available” for
preprocessing. This is to enforce that it stays within d dimensions, instead of
requiring ≈ ik dimensions where i is the number of recursion levels.
We use the following functions in Algorithm 3:
– The function pre(k) returns a preprocessing cost parameter for a given k.
– The function tail(k, c, d) returns a new cost parameter k⋆ such that enu-
meration in dimension k⋆ after preprocessing with pre(k⋆) in dimension d
costs at most as much as enumeration in dimension k after preprocessing in
dimension ⌈(1 + c) · k⌉. In particular, if d ≥ ⌈(1 + c) · k⌉ then k⋆ = k.
– Preprocessing (Step 4) calls Algorithm 4, perhaps restricted to a small num-
ber of while loops. Algorithm 4 is simply the BKZ algorithm where the SVP
oracle is replaced by Algorithm 3.
We plot the output of our simulations for Algorithm 3 in Figure 10. These
simulations are instantiations of Algorithm 1 with d > k, c > 0 and tail(x, y, z)
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Algorithm 3: Solving Approx-HSVP with preprocessing dimension
larger than enumeration dimension.
Data: A basis matrix B ∈ Rd×d.
Data: Cost parameter k ≥ 2 and an overshooting parameter c > 0.
Result: A short vector b.
1 k⋆ ← tail(k, c, d);
2 k′ ← pre(k⋆);
3 if k′ > 2 then
4 run Algorithm 4 on B with parameter k′;
5 else
6 run LLL on B;
7 end
8 b← Enum (B[0:k⋆));
9 return b;
matching those used in Algorithm 3. These were produced using blck.py, at-
tached to the electronic version of the full version of this work. Our strategy
finding strategy follows the same blueprint as described in Section 2.4. Through
such simulation experiments we manually established that c = 0.25, four sweeps
of preprocessing and using BKZ over SDBKZ seems to provide the best per-
formance, which is why we report data on these choices.11 We also fitted the
coefficients a0, a1, a2 of a0 · k log k + a1 · k + a2 to points from 100 to 249. Fur-
thermore, we plot the data from Figure 2 to provide a reference point for the
performance of the new algorithm and also provide some data on the hypothet-
ical performance of Algorithm 3 assuming the cost of all preprocessing costs is
only as much as LLL regardless of the choice of k′. This can be considered the
best case scenario for Algorithm 3 and thus a rough lower bound on its running
time.12
In Figure 11 we give the preprocessing cost parameters and probabilities
of success of a single enumeration selected by our optimisation. In particular,
these figures suggest that the success probability per enumeration does not drop
exponentially fast in Figure 11b. This is consistent with the second order term in
the time complexity which is closer to 1/2 (corresponding to standard pruning)
than 1 (corresponding to extreme pruning). Similarly, in contrast to Figure 3a
11 The choice c = 0.25 may be interpreted a posteriori as consistent with Figure 1
where the minimum for BKZ is attained at c ≈ 0.30. We note, however, that Figure 1
considers BKZ-reduced bases for block size k, whereas here the algorithm encounters
BKZ-reduced bases for block sizes k′ < k.
12 We note that this data only extends until k = 323. Computing pruning parameters
requires increasing precision in increasing dimension and become more “brittle” the
cheaper the preprocessing is compared to the enumeration cost. In other words,
our simulation code simply crashed with a floating-point error in dimension 324.
Since the trend is clear in the data already, we did not push it further using higher
precision.
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Algorithm 4: BKZ with Algorithm 3 as Approx-HSVP oracle.
Data: A basis matrix B ∈ Rd×d.
Data: Cost parameter k ≥ 2 and an overshooting parameter c ≥ 0.
Result: A reduced basis of L(B).
1 B ← LLL(B);
2 while change was made in previous iteration do
3 for 0 ≤ κ < d− 1 do
4 e← min(d, κ+ ⌈(1 + c) · k⌉);
5 v ← output of Algorithm 3 on (pi(B[κ:e)), k, c);
6 if ‖v‖ < ‖b∗κ‖ then
7 insert v at index κ;
8 call LLL to remove linear dependencies;
9 record that a change was made;
10 end
11 end
12 end
13 return B;
the preprocessing cost parameter (or “block size”) k′ in Figure 11a does not seem
to follow an affine function of k, i.e. it seems to grow faster for larger dimensions.
We also give experimental data comparing our implementation of Algorithm 3,
impl.py, attached to the electronic version of the full version of document, with
our simulations in Figure 12. We note that our implementation of Algorithm 3 is
faster than FPyLLL’s SVP solver from dimension 82 onward. As in Section 2.5, we
do not use the strategies produced by our simulation to run the implementation
but rely on a variant of FPLLL’s strategizer [dt17] to optimise these strategies.
Fig. 10: Cost of one call to Alg. 3 with enumeration dimension k, c = 1/4,
d = ⌈(1 + c) · k⌉ and four preprocessing sweeps.
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Fig. 11: Reduction strategies used for Figure 10.
(a) Preprocessing cost parameters used in our simulations.
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(b) Success probability of a single enumeration (in log) scale.
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Comparing Figures 2 and 10 is meaningless without taking the obtained root
Hermite factors into account. First, Algorithm 3 is not an SVP solver but an
Approx-HSVP solver. Second, if d < ⌈(1 + c) · k⌉ then Algorithm 3 will reduce
the enumeration dimension, further decreasing the quality of the output.
Since we are interested in running Algorithm 3 as a subroutine of Algorithm 4,
we compare the latter against plain BKZ. For this comparison we consider the
case d = 2·k, which corresponds to a typical setting encountered in cryptographic
applications.
In Figure 13, we plot the slope of the Gram–Schmidt log-norms as predicted
by our simulations for BKZ on the one hand, and a self-dual variant of Algo-
rithm 4. This variant first runs Algorithm 4 on the dual basis, followed by run-
ning Algorithm 4 on the original basis. Each run is capped at half the number
of sweeps as used for BKZ. The rationale for this strategy is that it handles the
quality degradation as the BKZ index i surpasses d− ⌈(1 + c) · k⌉ where k⋆ < k.
As Figure 13 illustrates, the obtained quality of the two algorithms is very close.
Indeed our SD variant slightly outperforms BKZ, but we note that the ratio of
the two is increasing, i.e. the quality advantage will invert as d increases.
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Fig. 12: Number of nodes visited during one Approx-HSVP call with enumeration
dimension k, c = 1/4, d = ⌈(1 + c) · k⌉ and four sweeps of preprocessing.
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Fig. 13: Basis quality (BKZ vs SD-Algorithm 4)
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